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JUVENILE WAIVER HEARINGS AND THE
HEARSAY RULE-THE NEED FOR RE-
LIABLE EVIDENCE AT THE CRITICAL
STAGE
INTRODUCTION
Roscoe Pound once wrote, "[T]he powers of the Star Chamber
were a trifle in comparison to those of our juvenile courts.",
Although there have been vast improvements made in the juvenile
justice system in the forty years since Dean Pound made this state-
ment, to a large degree the assertion is still valid. Under the parens
patriae doctrine, the juvenile justice system concentrates on the
rehabilitation rather than punishment of juvenile offenders.! While
in practice rehabilitation appears to be the more compassionate ap-
proach it affords the juvenile few of the procedural and evidentiary
safeguards available to the adult criminal defendant. As the
Supreme Court has noted, there is evidence that the juvenile often
receives the worst of both worlds.'
Nowhere in the juvenile system is this more true than in the
juvenile waiver hearing.' The waiver hearing is that unique judicial
setting where it is determined whether the juvenile will be tried
within the juvenile system or as an adult in an adult criminal court.
The Supreme Court has characterized this hearing as critically im-
portant' and yet has held that the hearing may be informal." This in-
formal atmosphere has become a breeding ground for the depriva-
tion of a substantial number of procedural and evidentiary
safeguards usually accorded a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
1. Pound, Foreward to P. YOUNG. SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION OF DELIN-
QUENTS at xxvii (1937).
2. Statistically, the post-adjudication rehabilitative functions of the juvenile
system are a failure. Approximately 75% of the juveniles who are incarcerated in
juvenile training schools become repeat offenders. UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (1977).
3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
4. "Waiver" is not the only word used to denote the decision to try the
juvenile as an adult rather than retain him in the juvenile system. For examples of
other terms, see State v. Jiminez, 109 Ariz. 305, 509 P.2d 198 (1973) (remand hearing);
In re I.Q.S.'s Welfare, - Minn. __ , 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976) (reference hearing);
Brown v. State, 550 P.2d 963 (Okla. Crim. 1976) (certification hearing); In re P.B.C., 538
S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (transfer hearing). However, for uniformity's sake the
term waiver will be employed throughout this note.
5. 383 U.S. at 553.
6. Id. at 561.
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This note explores one such area of deprivation, the admissibility
of hearsay evidence in waiver hearings. In general, jurisdictions
openly admit many forms of hearsay for use in making the waiver
decision. Under consideration here are only two of the various forms
of hearsay: the oral testimony by a police officer with regard to his
investigation of the alleged crime, and written social reports that
detail the juvenile's social history and psychological condition. These
two types of hearsay have been selected because they tend to be the
most prejudicial and unreliable forms of hearsay found in waiver
hearings. They are also the most commonly admitted. The numerous
problems presented by the admission of this type of evidence will be
thoroughly discussed and solutions to this troublesome legal issue
will be proposed.
A certain amount of background knowledge of the areas of the
law under consideration is necessary to effectuate a complete
understanding of these problems and proposals. Therefore, the pur-
poses and policies that underlie the juvenile justice system, the
waiver hearing, and the hearsay rule must be briefly explored.
PURPOSES AND POLICIES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
For almost eighty years the American legal system has
recognized that juvenile offenders should be treated differently than
adult criminals and has established an independent system of justice
to deal with them. 7 The founding principle of the juvenile justice
system was parens patriae' Generally, parens patriae refers to the
soverign power of guardianship over persons under a disability.'
When applied to the juvenile system, parens patriae becomes a
manifestation of the belief that children are to be protected, that
despite wrongdoings they should not be treated as adults, and that
because of their youth there exists a real potential for making them
7. The first American juvenile court opened in Chicago, Illinois on July 1,
1899, under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act. The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899,
1899 Ill. Laws, p. 131-37.
8. The term had its origins in the chancery courts of medieval England. It
conveyed the idea of protective jurisdiction through the power of the crown and was
used to maintain the structure of feudalism. After the American Revolution the con-
cepts of feudalism and the monarchy were no longer recognized in this country and
correspondingly, the chancery courts were abolished. Nevertheless, parens patriae was
retained. See Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 205 (1971), reprinted in F.
FAUST & P. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 72 (1974).
9. See In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871 (1915); McIntosh v. Dill, 86 Okla.
1, 205 P. 917 (1922).
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useful and productive citizens. Thus the goal of the early juvenile
system was rehabilitiation, not retribution."0
The concept of parens patriae remains the primary justifica-
tion for the present-day system's treatment of juveniles." Modern
decisions consistently reflect an attitude of benevolent paternalism
toward youthful offenders. Significantly, the doctrine has been re-
tained by the jurisdictions despite growing criticism and demands
for the application of the safeguards afforded adults."
As a corollary to parens patriae, most jurisdictions recognize a
presumption in favor of disposing of the juvenile within the juvenile
system. 8 However, it is widely felt that some juveniles are not
deserving of, or would not be benefitted by, the rehabilitative func-
tions of the juvenile court, and therefore, would best be dealt with
as adults." Consequently, almost all jurisdictions allow for waiver of
certain juvenile offenders from the relative sanctity of the juvenile
system to the potentially punitive arena of the adult criminal court.
10. In Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909), the author
stated:
The problem for determination by the [juvenile] court is not Has this boy
or girl committed a specific wrong?, but what is he?, How has he become
what he is?, and What had best be done in his interest and in the interest
of the state to save him from a downward career? [sic.]
Id. at 119-20.
11. In re Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 499 P.2d 1131 (1972) (a juvenile proceeding
is a protective proceeding entirely concerned with welfare of the child); In re Barker,
17 Md. App. 714, 305 A.2d 211 (1973) (most children will benefit from treatment by
juvenile system); People v. Soto, 64 Misc. 2d 515, 315 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1969) (basic purpose
of juvenile law is to avoid stigmatizing the worthy youth).
12. See Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness in a Quasi-
Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653 (1966); Whitebread and Batey, Transfer Bet-
ween Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REv. 221
(1977) (the Juvenile Justice Standards Project has advocted a "junior criminal court");
Note, Juveniles Tried as Adults: Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 3 J. CONTEMP.
L. 349 (1977).
The Supreme Court has perhaps best expressed this sentiment. In discussing
the criticisms of the juvenile system the Court stated that "if the formalities of the
criminal adjudicative process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system,
there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment
will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it."
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Atkins v. State, 259 Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972).
14. Mikulousky v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 196 N.W.2d 748 (1972) (although
rehabilitation and treatment are the juvenile system's underlying philosophies, this
does not mean that a juvenile is immune from criminal prosecutions).
19781
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Waiver Hearings
The waiver hearing is that stage of the juvenile process at
which the decision is made whether to treat the minor within the
juvenile system or to subject him to the adult criminal court. In
making the waiver decision, the interests of the juvenile and the
community in having the minor undergo rehabilitation are usually
weighed against the juvenile's potential for future criminal activity
and the need to protect the public from the resultant harm. Thus,
the waiver decision seeks the best possible result for both the
juvenile and the public. This goal has generally remained un-
changed 15 throughout the evolution of the juvenile system."
However, this is not true with regard to the procedures used in
deciding the waiver question.
The development of the juvenile system has witnessed an ap-
preciation by most jurisdictions of the need for waiver. There were,
however, no guidelines or constitutional requirements around which
the jurisdictions and their respective legislatures could formulate
procedures. This led to a wide variety of waiver practices among the
jurisdictions. 7 Many of these practices contained blatant constitu-
15. Compare, The Illinois Juvenile Court Act of 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws, p. 131-37,
with, Clemons v. State, __ Ind. 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
859 (1975).
16. Although most jurisdictions agree that the interests of the juvenile are to
be weighed against the need for public safety, the jurisdictions often differ as to the
weight to be given the two interests. For example, Oregon and Iowa appear to feel
that the interests should be balanced equally. However, Oregon states that the pur-
pose of waiver is to determine whether retaining in the juvenile court will best serve
the interests of the juvenile and the public. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Marion Co. v.
Johnson, 11 Or. App. 313, 501 P.2d 1011 (1972). Iowa holds that a juvenile should be
waived if waiver would be in the best interest of the juvenile or the public. In re
Brown, 183 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1971). Clearly, a juvenile has a potentially greater
chance of being waived in Iowa than he would have in Oregon, despite the fact that
the two interests are treated as of equal importance in both jurisdictions. Missouri, on
the other hand, has announced that the purpose of waiver is to insure the protection of
the public where rehabilitation is unlikely. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427
S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1968).
17. There were four main types of waiver procedures:
Judicial Waiver: This was, and remains the most common type of waiver pro-
cedure. Under this scheme the juvenile court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction
over minors between certain ages, but it was also given the power to divest itself of
this jurisdiction in favor of the adult court. This power was usually limited to the
higher age groups over which the court had jurisdiction, and also depended on a
number of independent criteria such as the type or severity of the crime, the juvenile's
record, or previous rehabilitative attempts.
Legislative Waiver: Under some state statutes the juvenile court was absolute-
ly prohibited from exercising jurisdiction over certain classes of juveniles. This was
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tional violations and were the subject of much criticism and demand
for change.18 The Supreme Court did not respond until 1966 when it
decided Kent v. United States.9
In Kent the Court noted the growing amount of criticism of the
juvenile justice system but did not feel compelled to impose all the
adult criminal safeguards on the juvenile courts.' Nevertheless, the
Court held that the constitutional standard of fundamental fairness
applies to waiver hearings. This standard requires that the juvenile
be given a hearing, the right to counsel, access to any studies or
reports considered by the court, and a statement of reasons for the
waiver decision.21
most often accomplished by setting a maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction, or
by removing from the juvenile system any minor who had allegedly committed a crime
punishable by life imprisonment or death.
Prosecutor's Choice: Some jurisdictions gave the power of the waiver decision
solely to the prosecutor by holding that the jurisdictions of the juvenile and criminal
courts were concurrent. This gave the prosecutor the option of filing charges in either
court. Other jurisdictions had similar provisions, but upon objection by the juvenile to
the prosecutor's choice the final decision-making authority was given to the circuit
court judge.
Waiver-Texas style: Under the Texas waiver statute adult court jurisdiction
began at seventeen for boys and eighteen for girls. The Texas courts, however, held
that age would be determined at the time of the trial and not the time of the offense.
This practice effectively gave the Texas prosecutors absolute power over the waiver
decision by allowing them to wait until the juvenile had reached the maximum age
before filing charges. Schornhorst, The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Kent
Revisited, 43 IND. L.J. 581, 596-602 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Schornhorst].
18. Id. See citations contained therein.
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Morris Kent was a sixteen year old boy who was
charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape. He was waived to adult court under
an order that recited that a "full investigation" had been made. The order was entered
without a ruling on the motion by the juvenile's counsel for a hearing and for access to
social reports, and without notification to Kent, his counsel, or his parents.
Soon after the Kent decision, a question arose as to whether the case was of a
constitutional dimension or whether the ruling applied only to the District of Colum-
bia, where the case arose. A number of courts held it applied only to the District of
Columbia. See, e.g., Stanley v. Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 209 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Harris,
67 Cal. 2d 876, 434 P.2d 615, 64 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1967). Today it is widely accepted that
Kent is of a constitutional dimension. Schornhorst, supra note 17, at 585-92 and cita-
tions therein.
20. 383 U.S. at 556. Further, the Court endorsed the concept of parens patriae
and stated that fundamental fairness did not mandate that the requirements of a
criminal trial or even the usual administrative hearing be imposed on the waiver pro-
cedure. Id. at 562. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
21. 383 U.S. at 557. The Kent decision also listed, by way of an appendix,
eight criteria which could be considered by a juvenile judge faced with a waiver deci-
sion.
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community
and whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
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Both Kent and the criticism of the former waiver procedures
have resulted in vast changes in the waiver practices employed by
the jurisdictions. Today almost every jurisdiction requires a hearing
as a prerequisite to waiver.' The hearing is typically composed of
two phases.
First, the judge must decide whether there is probable cause to
believe a crime has been committed and that the juvenile committed
it. Secondly, it must be determined whether the juvenile is
amenable to the rehabilitiative services available to the juvenile
court.' In making the waiver decision the juvenile judge usually
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an ag-
gressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or pro-
perty, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if
personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether
there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States At-
torney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire of-
fense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are
adults who will be charged with a crime in (an adult court).
6. The sophistimtion and maturity of the juvenile as deter-
mined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional at-
titude, and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including
previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods or proba-
tion to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and
the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
This list was the result of consultations with judges, U.S. Attorneys, and
representatives of the bar. It was later withdrawn due to criticism of its contents and
disagreement as to its propriety. Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court.
More Brickbrats and Another ProposaL 114 PA. L. REv. 1171, 1208 (1966).
22. At least two jurisdictions do not require a hearing. Nebraska allows the
prosecutor to decide in which court the juvenile will be charged. State v. Grayer, 191
Neb. 523, 215 N.W.2d 859 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-202(3)(b)-(c), 42-202.01 (Supp.
1975). New York, on the other hand, has no waiver statute. The juvenile courts of that
state only have jurisdiction over children under sixteen. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
23. Some jurisdictions consider only the amenability of the juvenile. See, e.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST. Code § 707 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-817(a) (Supp. 1976). The vast majority, however, require that adverse findings
of probable cause and amenability be made before the juvenile can be waived. E.g., IND.
CODE ANN § 31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712 A.4(4) (Supp.
1977-78).
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considers a number of independent criteria. Typically, these include
the nature and seriousness of the alleged crime, the aggression,
violence, or premeditation with which the alleged crime was commit-
ted, and whether the alleged crime was directed toward persons or
property. Also commonly considered are the juvenile's attitude,
maturity, and degree of criminal sophistication, his social history, in-
cluding home, school, or environmental studies, and the safety and
interest of the public.' The juvenile judge generally must consider
all the cr;teria listed in a particular waiver statute, but the weight
given to each factor is usually left to the judge's descretion.2
A general knowledge of the purposes and procedures of a
typical waiver hearing is essential to a full comprehension of the
problems involved with the admission of hearsay evidence in waiver
hearings. Of equal importance is a general understanding of the pur-
poses and policies of the hearsay rule.
The Hearsay Rule
Hearsay may be defined as evidence of a statement, other than
an in-court assertion of a witness, that is offered to prove the truth
of the facts asserted.2' For centuries the courts have recognized the
potentially unreliable qualities of such untested assertions and have
refused to consider them in reaching judicial conclusions.' This
24. The juvenile's age, his police record, and the availability of suitable
rehabilitative programs are also criteria that can be found in waiver statutes.
No waiver statute requires that all of these criteria be taken into account in
deciding waiver. Most often the statutes list between three and five of the criteria as
relevant to the judge's decision. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1976)
(best interest of the public, aggravated character of the crime, and the juvenile's
record); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712 A. 4(4) (Supp. 1977-78) (prior record, seriousness
of the crime, whether crime is part of repetitive pattern, best interests of society and
juvenile).
For an excellent analysis of waiver criteria and standards, see Stamm, Transfer
of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Cour4 62 Ky. L.J. 124 (1973).
25. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-108 (1973).
26. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). See Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735, 737
(1926); State v. Ah Lee, 18 Or. 540, 23 P. 424, 425 (1890). See also C. MCCORMICK, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972), 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1974); Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14
VAND. L. REV. 741, 768 (1961).
27. The hearsay rule first began to crystallize in the late 17th century. 5
WIGMORE, surpa note 26, at § 1364. Judge Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has perhaps best, and most eloquently, expressed the general feeling of both
lawyers and judges to this type of evidence. "Hearsay is merely a legal term for an un-
confirmed rumor. Pouring rumored scandal into the bent ear of blabbering busybodies
in a pool room or gambling house is no more disreputable than pronouncing it with a
clipped accent in a court of law." In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 531
(Musmanno, J., dissenting), cerL denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954).
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recognition is manifest in the hearsay rule which requires that all
evidence offered be subject to three conditions: oath, personal
presence, and cross-examination." These are the conditions under
which evidence can be best examined for the potential errors,
biases, and misconceptions which may render a statement inaccurate
and unreliable. Evidence not susceptible to these three conditions
cannot be adequately tested, and with notable exception,' is
therefore not admissible.
THE PROBLEM OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN WAIVER HEARINGS
Every jurisdiction that provides for juvenile waiver hearings
similar to the type set forth previously" must deal with the problem
of whether or not to consider hearsay in deciding the waiver ques-
tion. Hearsay in waiver hearings may take many forms. However, two
28. Oath: Generally, all witnesses who testify in a judicial proceeding are re-
quired to do so under oath. This practice can be seen as a ceremonial and religious
symbol that induces a special obligation to tell the truth, and that impresses upon the
witness the importance of his testimony and the potential sanctions for perjury. Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 26, at § 245. Although this practice has lost some of its effec-
tiveness and is today arguably nothing more than a meaningless formality, there is no
apparent disposition to relax the tradition. Introductory Note, Art. VIII Hearsay, FED.
R. EVID. [hearinafter cited as FED. R. EviD. Intro.].
Personal Presence: Personal presence in the courtroom allows the trier of the
fact to observe the witness's demeanor. This has traditionally been considered of in-
valuable assistance in determining the witness's credibility and trustworthiness, and
thereby, the proper weight to be given his testimony. Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B.,
340 U.S. 474, 495-96 (1951); State v. Thomas, 110 Ariz. 120, 515 P.2d 865 (1973). See
also Sahm, Demeanor Evidence: Elusive and Intangible Imponderables, 47 A.B.A.J.
580 (1961). Also, it it reasonable to assume that any propensity for lying will be
somewhat diminished by the presence of the party against whom the evidence is
directed. FED. R. EVID. Intro.
Cross-Examination: Cross-examination is widely considered the most important
condition under which evidence must be presented. In fact, Wigmore defines hearsay
in terms of cross-examination, 5 WIGMORE, supra note 26, at § 1362, and has asserted
that cross-examination is "beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth." 5 WIGMORE, surpa note 26, at § 1367. Although every authori-
ty does not agree with the absoluteness of this contention, it is universally accepted
that the power of cross-examination is one of the legal system's most effective stimuli
for truth-telling, and is an essential tool in exposing bias and faults in a witness's
perception and memory. FED. R. EVID.. Intro.; MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at § 245.
29. There are many exceptions to the hearsay rule. However, there are two
principles that underlie all the exceptions. The first is necessity, such as where the
declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable. The second involves situations where there
is a circumstantial probability of the trustworthiness of the evidence. 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 26, at § 1420.
30. The most common form of waiver hearing has two phases: a finding as to
probable cause, and a determination of amenability. It also consists of a consideration
of a number of independent criteria. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss2/6
JUVENILE WAIVER HEARINGS
types of hearsay are most commonly admitted: testimony, usually by
a police officer, with regard to his investigation of the crime that
the juvenile has allegedly committed, and social reports. These
reports are generally composed of environmental and psychological
information that varies depending on the juvenile, the judge, and
the jurisdiction. Before considering these specific forms of hearsay
as they relate to waiver hearings it is necessary to note the vital im-
portance of the waiver hearing to both the juvenile and to the com-
munity of which he is a part.
The Importance of the Waiver Hearing
In setting forth the constitutionally mandated prerequisites for
a valid wavier order the landmark case of Kent v. United States3 1
stressed the "tremendous consequence""2 of this "critically impor-
tant"3  step in the juvenile process. The Court noted 4 that once a
juvenile is waived to the adult criminal court he loses a large
number of privileges and immunities available only within the pur-
view of the juvenile system. Once waived the juvenile is no longer
afforded the protection of anonymity 5 and becomes subject to the
publicity that often surrounds a criminal trial." Thus if guilty, it is
at the waiver hearing that the juvenile faces the possibility of being
publicly labeled a criminal. This causes future problems with
employment, vocational or professional training, the loss of certain
citizenship rights, and perhaps most importantly, the social
stigmatization of being a convicted felon. 7
31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32. Id at 554.
33. Id at 553.
34. Id at 553-57. See also Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970);
People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1976); R_ E_
M_ v. State, 541 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
35. Anonymity is one of the keystones of the parens patriae doctrine. It is
most obviously exemplified in the names that some jurisdictions give to juvenile cases.
E.g., In re J.S., 556 P.2d 641 (Okla. Crim. 1976); R_ E_ M_ v. State, 541 S.W.2d 841
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977).
One Arizona case provides a particularly striking example. A juvenile was
charged with felony murder for the arson of a hotel. He was waived and found guilty
in an adult criminal court. His appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals primarily con-
cerned the validity of the waiver order. The citation for that decision, which upheld
the waiver is: In re Anonymous, Juv. Ct. No. 6358-4, 14 Ariz. App. 466, 484 P.2d 235
(1971). The case was then taken to the Arizona Supreme Court. The Supreme Court's
opinion was almost thirty pages long but devoted only one short paragraph to the
waiver issue. See State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938 (1975).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090 (1975).
37. See Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
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There are also more immediate dangers that the juvenile faces.
For example, most juvenile statutes prohibit the incarceration of a
juvenile beyond his majority,' but if the juvenile is waived he is
considered an adult and can be sentenced accordingly." Further,
because a waived juvenile is treated as an adult the waiver hearing
may be his last opportunity to raise the defense of diminished
responsibility."
The waiver hearing is also of great importance to the communi-
ty as a whole. Primarily, the juvenile justice system serves to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders, not to punish them.'1 If a juvenile is
waived no attempt at rehabilitation will be made and the community
may lose a potentially productive citizen. On the other hand, if a
youthful offender is retained in the juvenile system when there is
little or no chance of rehabilitating him, the public may be exposed
to a dangerous influence sooner than necessary.' 2
In light of the tremendous impact the waiver decision has on
both the juvenile and the community, every precaution should be
taken to insure that the evidence relied on at the waiver hearing be
competent and reliable. The potential for error in the waiver pro-
cess should be as small as possible, especially in those jurisdictions
that do not allow for appellate review of the waiver decision until
after conviction in the adult criminal court.' Despite the logic of
these assertions, the majority of jurisdictions admit hearsay at
waiver hearings. The next two sections are devoted to an analysis
and critique of this practice in its most common forms-police
testimony and social reports.
38. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 556. See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. §47.10.080(c)(1)
(maximum period of juvenile commitment not to exceed twentieth birthday).
39. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02(h) (upon waiver the child shall be
dealt with as an adult in accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure).
40. Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1970).
41. See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
42. For example, in Indiana a sixteen year old boy found guilty of rape in
juvenile court may only be incarcerated for five years because the juvenile court loses
it jurisdiction over him when he is twenty-one. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-7 (Burns 1973).
However, if the juvenile is waived and found guilty of the same offense he may be im-
prisoned for up to fifty years. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-4-1, 35-50-2-4 (Burns Supp. 1977).
43. E.g., Snellgrove v. Porter Circuit and Juvenile Courts et al., 777-S-529
(1977); In re Trader, 227 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974). Contra, P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d
837 (Alaska 1972); In re I.Q.S. Welfare, - Minn. - , 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976); State v.
Evangelista, 134 N.J. Super. 64, 338 A.2d 224 (1975).
For a complete discussion of this problem and the available remedies, see Note,
Review of Imporper Juvenile Transfer Hearings, 60 VA. L. REV. 818 (1974).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss2/6
JUVENILE WAIVER HEARINGS
POLICE TESTIMONY AS TO THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED CRIME
Most state waiver statutes require the juvenile judge to con-
sider a number of criteria with regard to the nature and commission
of the alleged crime." These considerations can be of much
assistance to the judge in at least partially determining the
juvenile's attitude, his propenisty for crime, and the degree of
threat the juvenile poses to the public. They are also necessary for
the determination of probable cause. 5 Therefore, the nature of the
crime and the circumstances surrounding its commission are of vital
importance to a proper decision on the waiver issue." This evidence
usually has its source in the victims or eyewitnesses 7 of the crime
that the juvenile has allegedly committed.'" The problem is how to
present this evidence at the waiver hearing.
The proper method of producing evidence at the waiver hear-
ing as to the nature and commission of the alleged crime would be
to require direct testimony from the victims and eyewitnesses of the
crime. The juvenile court should require the state to produce each
and every victim or eyewitness upon whom the prosecution intends
to rely in proving its case for waiver. These witnesses should be re-
quired to testify under oath and in the presence of the juvenile.
They should also be subjected to complete cross-examination by the
juvenile's attorney. These are the conditions which our legal system
has established as being the most conducive to the production of
competent and reliable evidence."9 In light of the critical importance
44. The most common of these are: 1) the nature and seriousness of the alleg-
ed crime, 2) the aggression, violence, or premeditation with which the crime was com-
mitted, and 3) whether the crime was directed toward persons or property. See notes
24-25 supra and accompanying text.
45. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
46. A great many states recognize the importance of these criteria and
specifically require consideration of them in their respective waiver statutes. E.g.,
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37 § 702-7
(1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712 A.4
(Supp. 1974).
47. By "eyewitness" is meant not only persons who actually observed a crime
take place, but also persons who have direct personal knowledge of any facts relevant
to the commission of the crime.
48. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, __ Ind. App. - , 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); Hazell v. State, 12 Md. App. 144, 277 A.2d 639 (1971);
State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 442 P.2d 632 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969). In
all these cases police officers testified as to their investigation of the alleged crime.
For the most part, their information originated with either victims or eyewitnesses of
the crime.
49. The hearsay rule requires that evidence be presented subject to these
three conditions. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
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of the waiver decision to both the child and the community, 50 the
juvenile court would be justified in demanding that any evidence as
to this important aspect of the waiver determination be in the most
competent and reliable form. 1
The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, allow evidence of
the nature and commission of the alleged crime to be presented by
way of a police officer's testimony." In testifying, the officer will
usually relate to the court, under prosecutorial questioning, the
results of his investigation of the crime. To fully inform the court
with regard to this evidence the officer must relate not only the
type of crime allegedly committed, but also the details of the crime's
commission. Thus unless the officer actually saw the crime take
place he must rely in large part on statements from the victims and
eyewitnesses.' This method of producing evidence for the juvenile
court's consideration ignores the many potential problems in hear-
say testimony of this type.
Statements to a police officer by an eyewitness or victim of a
crime may contain a variety of inaccurate and unreliable informa-
tion. A victim or eyewitness may be shocked by the traumatic ex-
perience of the crime and may feel a special kind of hostility toward
its perpetrator." An eyewitness may not have seen the entire crime
or for a number of reasons may have been unable to get an accurate
mental picture of the event.' Also, a victim or eyewitness may have
50. See notes 31-43 supra and accompanying text.
51. A surprisingly small number of states have statutes or judicial decisions
similar to the procedure advocated here. Alaska provides that hearsay evidence is not
competent to establish either a finding of waiver or delinquency. ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.060 (1966) (Alaska R. Child. Pro. 3(e) & 17(a)). See also P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837
(Alaska 1972). Although it did not prohibit hearsay, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held that when a juvenile judge receives material that would be inadmissible under
the rules of evidence, and that material is challenged by the juvenile, the judge may
require the proponent of the evidence to substantiate it. D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286,
251 N.W.2d 196 (1977). At least one other court has questioned the propriety of relying
on testimonial hearsay by police officers, but has nonetheless refused to hold it inad-
missible. Hazell v. State, 12 Md. App. 144, 277 A.2d 639 (1971).
52. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, __ Ind. App. -, 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975); In re Flowers, 13 Md. App. 414, 283 A.2d 430 (1971);
Hazell v. State, 12 Md. App. 144, 277 A.2d 639 (1971); In re Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198
(Tex. Civ. App. 1976); State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 442 P.2d 632 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
53. See note 48 supra.
54. J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT (1966) [hereinafter cited
as MARSHALL]; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARV. L. REv. 177 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Morgan].
55. MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 43-53.
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had previous contacts with the perpetrator and as a result may have
previously formed opinions of him." These emotions or conditions
could lead to exaggeration, confusion, bias, or any number of inac-
curacies in the statements given to police officers. 7 Although no
police officer would knowingly take an inaccurate statement few
policemen possess the training, legal knowledge, or inclination to
ascertain the deficiencies of a statement to the same degree as
would a competent defense counsel." Thus when the police officer
testifies at the waiver hearing the potential unreliability and inac-
curacy of the eivdence is transmitted to the judge and is used in
deciding the waiver question.
This problem is not solved by even extensive cross-examination
of the police officer by the juvenile's counsel. Although deficiencies
in the officer's investigative techniques will best be exposed by sub-
jecting him to cross-examination, none of the deficiencies in the
statements of the witnesses themselves are discoverable. All the
police officer can do is recite what the people he interviewed have
told him. Most police investigations, due to inherent time and talent
restrictions, are incapable of uncovering the multitude of cir-
cumstances and prejudices that can render an out-of-court statement
inaccurate. Thus cross-examination of the police officer does little to
minimize the unreliability of his hearsay testimony.
Despite the problems with the admission of a police officer's
testimony as proof of the nature and commission of the alleged
crime most jurisdictions admit this type of evidence at waiver hear-
ings.59 A wide variety of reasons have been asserted to support this
practice. The most common of these rationales warrant a discussion
and critical analysis.
56. See generally MARSHALL, supra note 54, at 65.
57. MARSHALL. supra note 54; Morgan, supra note 54, at 185-188.
58. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE POLICE 126-30 (1967).
59. Clemons v. State, - Ind. App. , 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975); In re Murphy, 15 Md. App. 434, 291 A.2d 869 (1972); In re Flowers,
13 Md. App. 414, 283 A.2d 430 (1971); In re Waters, 13 Md. App. 95, 281 A.2d 560
(1971): In re Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); State v. Piche, 74 Wash.
2d 9, 442 P.2d 632 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
60. When discussing this problem the jurisdictions may often be concerned
with testimonial hearsay in general. However, because a police officer's testimony of
the type under consideration here is a form of testimonial hearsay the reasons given to
support the admission of testimonial hearsay are applicable to a consideration of a
police officer's hearsay testimony.
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Rationales for the Admission of Hearsay Testimony by Police
It is often asserted that a judge, being a legally trained and
competent individual, has the ability and knowledge to give general-
ly inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, only its proper weight."'
Thus it is argued, the juvenile judge will recognize the testimony of
a police officer as hearsay and, knowing the unreliable qualities of
such evidence, will take this into account in considering the
testimony." Although this assertion may be correct in some contexts
it is generaly inapplicable in a situation where the juvenile judge
must base his finding, or at least an important part of his finding,
totally on normally inadmissible evidence. Notwithstanding the
highest degree of competence or experience no judge can une-
quivocally decide what evidence is accurate or which statement was
biased when all the evidence before him is potentially unreliable.'3
Without the benefit of hearing the sworn and cross-examined
testimony of the person who gave a statement, the judge's decision
as to the weight to be given that statement may be little more than
educated speculation." In light of the importance of the waiver hear-
ing,' speculation, no matter how educated, should not be used as a
basis for the waiver decision.
One of the functions of the typical waiver hearing is to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the juvenile committed it." This function is
accomplished in the adult system in what is commonly called the
preliminary hearing.67 The Supreme Court" and a number of lesser
courts" have held that hearsay evidence is admissible at preliminary
61. McDonald v. State, - Ind. App. , 382 N.E.2d 436 (1975); King v.
State, 155 Ind. App. 361, 292 N.E.2d 843 (1973) (judge can separate the wheat from the
chaff). See also Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79
HARV. L. REV. 407 (1965).
62. Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d at 866. Cf. Williams v. State, 219 S.W.2d 509
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (juvenile judge will not consider improper allegations).
63. "No matter how trained and experienced a Juvenile Court judge may be,
he cannot by any magical fishing rod draw forth the truth out of a confused sea of
speculation, rumor, suspicion, and hearsay. He must follow certain procedures which
the wisdom of the centuries have established." In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 603, 109
A.2d 523, 529 (Musmanno, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954).
64. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 31-43 supra and accompanying text.
66. See note 23 supra.
67. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1.
68. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
69. E.g., In re Walters, 15 Cal. 3d 738, 543 P.2d 607, 126 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975);
Schram v. State, - Del. -, 366 A.2d 1185 (1976); People ex rel. Pierce v. Thomas,
70 Misc. 2d 629, 334 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1972); Commonwealth v. Rick, - Pa. Super. Ct.
-, 366 A.2d 312 (1976).
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hearings. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have a provision
to the same effect.7 1 Since both waiver hearings and preliminary
hearings seek to establish probable cause" it has been asserted that
hearsay in the form of police testimony is admissible at waiver hear-
ings for the purpose of establishing probable cause."2 This reasoning
effectively circumvents the requirement of sworn, personal, and
cross-examined testimony of all victims and eyewitnesses. The bet-
ter practice, however, would be to exclude hearsay for whatever
purpose it is offered. As previously demonstrated the problems of
exaggeration, misconception, bias, and confusion demand that hear-
say evidence be excluded." To require evidence to be in one form
for one phase of the waiver hearing and then to require a different
form for another phase of the hearing would be an extreme waste of
judicial time with little apparent benefit to the juvenile or the court.
The juvenile court's decision on probable cause will be rendered no
less accurate by requiring all victims and eyewitnesses to testify. At
the same time the court's energies will be maximized and the fin-
dings regarding the nature and commission of the alleged crime will
be as reliable as possible.
Another commonly asserted reason for the admission of
testimonial hearsay in waiver hearings is that the hearing must be
informal. It is widely felt that the goals of parens patriae will best
be met if the waiver hearing is conducted in a relaxed, informal at-
mosphere.7 ' This type of atmosphere is often asserted to be the most
conducive setting for determining what is best for the child." It has
also been asserted that the imposition of the strict rules of evidence
would detract from this informal atmosphere and thereby conflict
with the parens patriae doctrine and the best interests of the
juvenile.7" Although strict adherence to the rules of evidence may in-
70. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a).
71. See, e.g., In re Pima Co. Juv. Action No. J-47734-1, 26 Ariz. App. 46, 546
P.2d 23 (1976). The court specifically discussed this similarity.
72. Id.; In re Anonymous, Juv. Ct. No. 6358-4, 14 Ariz. App. 466, 484 P.2d 235
(1971), affd sub nom. State v. Taylor, 112 Ariz. 68, 537 P.2d 938 (1975); In re B.T., 145
N.J. Super. 268, 367 A.2d 887 (1976), appeal denied, 73 N.J. 49, 372 A.2d 314 (1977)
(mem.). See also Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding hearsay ad-
missible at juvenile detention hearings).
73. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
74. E.g., People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr.
392 (1976). The Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 561, announced
that waiver hearings "may be informal."
75. People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d at 718-20, 557 P.2d at 988-90, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 404-05.
76. Harling v. United States, 295 U.S. 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (strict procedural
safeguards are inappropriate to the informality and flexability required by parens
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deed detract from the desired atmosphere, too much emphasis
should not be placed on the need for informality." When an eviden-
tiary rule such as the hearsay rule is not merely technical, but ex-
ists to insure the accuracy of the evidence presented, it should be in-
cluded in a judicial proceeding of the importance of the waiver hear-
ing. 7
Similar to the informality rationale, some courts have asserted
that since guilt or innocence is not determined at the waiver hear-
ing, the hearing is non-adversary and dispositional in nature.
Therefore, these courts conclude, there is no need for the imposition
of the hearsay rule. 9 Although a waiver hearing is non-adversary in
the sense that under parens patriae the hearing seeks only to serve
patriae); People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1976)
(nature of waiver hearing precludes imposition of strict evidentiary standards). See
also Whitlach, Practice and Procedure in the Juvenile Court 21 CLEV. B.A.J. 118, 125
(1950): "[C]lose adherence to the strict rules of evidence might prevent the court from
obtaining important facts as to the child's character and condition which could only be
to the child's detriment."
77. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 554-55 (parens patriae is not an in-
vitation to procedural arbitrariness); In re Holmes, 79 Pa. 599, 604, 109 A.2d 523, 530,
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1954) (informality may at times result in confusion, slop-
piness, and unreliability). See also Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in
Waiver Proceedings, 12 ST. Louis L.J. 424 (1968).
In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Supreme Court made the following state-
ment while discussing juvenile adjudications:
The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one in which a
fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the erring youth by
talking over his problems, by paternal advice and admonition, and in
which, in extreme situations, benevolent and wise institutions of the State
provided guidance and help to save him from a downward career. Then,
as now, goodwill and compassion were admirably present. But recent
studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the
validity of this gentle conception. They suggest that the appearance as
well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short the
essentials of due process-may be a more impressive and therapeutic at-
titude so far as the juvenile is concerned.
Id at 25-26.
78. Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775 (1966). See also Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fun-
damental Fairness for the Accused in a Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653
(1966). In discussing delinquency proceedings the author asserts: "Whatever the court
gains by a less oppressive atmosphere, more will be lost when the child is unjustly
found delinquent." Id. at 685.
79. Clemons v. State, __ Ind. App. -, 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975); In re B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268, 367 A.2d 887 (1976); State ex rel.
Juv. Dept. of Marion Co. v. Johnson, 11 Or. App. 313, 501 P.2d 1101 (1972); In re
Harbert, 85 Wash. 2d 719, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975); State v. Piche, 74 Wash. 2d 9, 442 P.2d
632 (1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
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the best interests of the juvenile and the community, this function is
accomplished in an essentially adversary manner. The only impartial
participant in the waiver hearing is the judge. The prosecutor and
defense counsel are no less adversaries in a waiver hearing than at
any other stage of the juvenile process. That the hearing seeks to
protect the best interests of those involved is a fact that supports
the exclusion of hearsay evidence at waiver hearings. If the juvenile
judge is to successfully and accurately balance the interests of the
juvenile and the community it would seem that he should have the
most reliable evidence available for his deliberations. Although most
evidence presented at waiver hearings is dispositional in nature"
this in not an excuse for the admission of testimonial hearsay.
Dispositional evidence is similar to other types of evidence in the
sense that if it is presented via hearsay testimony it suffers from
potential unreliability."1 In light of the tremendous consequences in-
volved, it would be better if the waiver decision were not based on
unreliable evidence, no matter what its type.
A final reason that is often employed for refusing to apply the
hearsay rule to a police officer's testimony at waiver hearings is
that Kent v. United States" did not expressly or impliedly require
the prohibition of hearsay.' This reliance is somewhat misplaced.
Although certain inferences may be drawn from the case, the issue
of the admissibility of hearsay was not before the Court in Kent." In
fact, there has never been a Supreme Court decision on the propriety
of hearsay evidence at any stage of the juvenile process. 5 It is dif-
80. Most of the juvenile court judge's considerations concern such things as
the juvenile's attitude, emotional stability, environment, and his propensity for crime.
See note 24 supra and accompanying text. However, even considerations that directly
relate to the alleged crime have an impact on dispositional matters. See note 47 supra
and accompanying text.
81. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
82. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
83. The Court did require a hearing, the right to counsel, access to social
reports, and a statement of reasons for the wavier decision.
The courts that hold that Kent did not require a hearsay prohibition rely heavi-
ly on this statement from the opinion: "We do not mean ... to indicate that the hear-
ing to be held must conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even the
usual administrative hearing .. " 383 U.S. at 562. E.g., Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d
at 864; State ex rel. Juv. Dept. of Marion Co. v. Johnson, 501 P.2d at 1015; State v.
Piche, 442 P.2d at 635; Sheppard v. Rhay, 73 Wash. 2d 734, 440 P.2d 422, 425 (1968);
Williams v. Rhay, 73 Wash. 2d 770, 440 P.2d 427, 428 (1968).
84. The only issues presented were those decided by the Court: right to hear-
ing, right to counsel, access to social reports, and a statement of reasons. 383 U.S. at
552.
85. At the state level, In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 187, 407 P.2d 760, 768 (1965),
held a juvenile judge may consider hearsay at a juvenile adjudication if it was "of a
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ficult, therefore, to understand how Kent, or any other Supreme
Court decision, can be interpreted as endorsing the admission of
testimonial hearsay at waiver hearings.
In light of the many potential problems with a police officer's
repetition of the out-of-court statements of victims and
eyewitnesses, the reasons most commonly asserted for the admis-
sion of this testimonial hearsay evidence may be inadequate to sup-
port the practice. But when properly presented, the officer's infor-
mation is of vital importance to the waiver decision. Therefore, the
best method of producing evidence as to the nature and commission
of the alleged crime is to require the sworn, personal, and cross-
examined testimony of all victims and eyewitnesses upon whom the
state intends to rely in proving its case for waiver. In this way the
juvenile court could most effectively prevent an improper decision
on this vital aspect of the waiver hearing, and thereby serve the
best interests of both the juvenile and the community.
THE USE OF SOCIAL REPORTS IN THE WAIVER HEARING
The second type of hearsay to be considered in the context of
juvenile waiver hearings is the written evidence commonly
characterized as social reports. These social reports are usually com-
piled by a juvenile probation officer or social worker and their con-
tents may vary widely depending on the juvenile and the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. Typically the reports contain such
things as environmental studies, family histories, results of
psychological evaluations, and school and police records." The
sources of information for the social reports are usually interviews
with family, friends, and professional people who have had contact
with the juvenile.'
kind on which reasonable men are accustomed to rely." The Supreme Court did not
rule on this issue. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966).
86. See generally Teitelbaum, The Use of Social Reports in Juvenile Court
Adjudications, 7 J. FAM. L. 425, 433-37 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Teitelbaum].
87. The information for the social reports be obtained from a variety of
sources. Typical examples include:
1) Interviews with the juvenile,
2) Visits to the home and interviews with the child's parents,
3) Interviews with relatives, neighbors, or companions,
4) Interviews with principals, teachers, and other school officials,
5) Interviews with past or present employers,
6) Interviews or reports from other social or public agencies that have had
contact with the juvenile or his family.
H. Lou. JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 116-17 (1927).
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Potential problems arise when social reports are submitted to
the juvenile court as evidence and the information contained in the
reports is not subjected to the requirements of the hearsay rule."
The out-of-court statements made by third persons to the probation
officer are untested and unsworn, and therefore, potentially
unreliable. 9 Statements made or information obtained from the
juvenile himself may also be unreliable if the reporting techniques
used in making the report are questionable or the author of the
report had biased or hostile feelings toward the juvenile. Moreover,
poor reporting techniques may have an adverse effect on the ac-
curate relation of not only the juvenile's statements but also the
rest of the information contained in the report.
There are a number of potential problems involved in the
preparation of a social report. Lack of sufficient time or various
restrictions or demands imposed by the juvenile court on the proba-
tion officer may result in a precipitate or incomplete report." The
probation officer himself may be prejudiced toward the juvenile.
Finally, the probation officer, like the police officer,9' generally lacks
the legal training and ability to uncover the bias or misconceptions
that can underlie a third person's statement. Thus, rumor or other
unreliable information may satisfy a probation officer and may be in-
cluded in his report as fact.2
Even if a social report is well prepared and its author unbiased
there remains a wide variety of potential problems with the
statements themselves. The statements of neighbors, relatives,
friends, and the like may be based on misconceptions, rumors, or in-
adequate personal knowledge.9 There may also be a hostile attitude
88. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[tihere is no irrebuttable presumption
of accuracy attached to staff reports." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 563.
89. The case of In re J.S., 556 P.2d 641, 643, (Okla. Crim. 1976), stated that
even the "benevolent intention" and "nonadversary role" of a juvenile probation officer
cannot mitigate the potential dangers and inaccuracies of a social report. See also
Teitelbaum, supra note 86.
90. Comment, Representing the Juvenile Defendant in Waiver Proceedings,
12 ST. LouIs L.J. 424, 452 n. 113 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Representing the Juvenile
Defendant]. At least one caseworker has stated that the conclusions and recommenda-
tions contained in her social reports are often based on little more than educated
speculation.
91. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
92. Representing the Juvenile Defendant, supra note 90, at 452.
93. MARSHALL, supra note 54; Krasnow, Social Reports in the Juvenile
Courts: Their Uses and Abuses, 12 CRIME AND DELIN. 151, 155 (1966) [hereinafter cited
as Krasnow].
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toward the juvenile that is based on one or two isolated incidents."
This type of emotion is especially dangerous since a person with a
hostile or negative feeling toward the juvenile may be more inclined
to make an incriminating statement to a juvenile caseworker than to
testify in court.9"
Similar problems arise with regard to interviews with school
personnel or special reports filed by school authorities. A student's
demeanor, dress, hair, or associations may mean more to teachers
and principals than specific acts of misconduct." Thus, the student
may be labeled a behavior problem on the basis of facts that are
totally irrelevant to his behavior. This type of reputation may have
a tendency to be self-perpetuating as new teachers and staff are
warned of the "trouble maker."97
Often, when a question on the juvenile's sanity or general men-
tal capacity is raised the juvenile judge will order extensive in-
dependent psychiatric testing of the child." Serious problems may
arise when the results of this testing are communicated to the
juvenile court solely by way of a written report. The methods and
objectivity of those conducting the tests may not be free from error.
The information contained in the evaluations may be highly
technical or couched in professional terms. Few juvenile judges
possess the knowledge of medicine or the social sciences to properly
evaluate this type of report without the guiding hand of its author."
Despite all these potential problems with social reports the in-
formation contained in the reports is of considerable importance to a
proper waiver decision. This information is especially important
with regard to determining whether the youth is amenable to the
rehabilitative services available to the juvenile court.'" This impor-
94. MARSHALL, supra note 54; Krasnow, supra note 93.
95. Krasnow, supra note 93.
96. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 252 (1967).
97. Id.
98. E.g., State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (reports
from two psychiatrists, two psychologists, one medical doctor, and one psychiatric
social worker), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974); In re Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1976) (written psychological evaluation).
99. See Smith, A Profile of Juvenile Court Judges in the United States, 25
JUV. JUST. 27 (1974).
100. Amenability is one of the two phases of a typical waiver hearing. See note
23 supra and accompanying text. Criteria such as the juvenile's social history, attitude,
and degree of criminal sophistication are often employed in determining a juvenile's
amenability to rehabilitation. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
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tance is reflected in a number of states through statutes which allow
the juvenile judge to request and study such reports, 1 ' and in other
states by requiring that a "full investigation" be held prior to the
hearing."' In light of the importance of the information contained in
social reports and the potential hearsay problems0 2 in admitting the
reports as evidence, the problem becomes how to present the infor-
mation in a reliable competent form.
The better method of producing the evidence contained in
social reports would be to allow the juvenile judge to consider the
reports, but also to make available for sworn cross-examination all
authors and third persons whose statements are contained in the
reports. It is widely recognized that the most effective method of
producing reliable and competent evidence is to subject the
evidence to the conditions of oath, personal presence, and cross-
examination.0 ' In light of the crucial importance of the waiver deci-
sion,'0 5 it would seem that the critical aspects of the decision should
be based, as much as possible, on accurate evidence. The important
information that is contained in a social report, therefore, is best
weighed and analyzed when it is presented via sworn cross-
examined testimony.
By allowing for the sworn cross-examined testimony of the
authors and interviewees of the social reports the juvenile court
would be able to obtain the most accurate available picture of the
juvenile's background and mental condition. A poorly prepared
report has less value than no report at all as it is more likely to con-
tain distortions of facts and opinions! ° Through the use of sworn
101. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-108(3) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.09(d)
(Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE, CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 3-817 (Supp. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 54.02 (a) (1975).
102. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-5-7-14 (Burns Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37,
§ 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 553;
Green v. United States, 308 F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Pee v. United States, 274
F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
"Full investigation" is usually interpreted to include the submission of social
reports. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 559, citing, Watkins v. United States, 343
F.2d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See generally Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d at 866-67.
See also In re Patterson, 210 Kan. 245, 490 P.2d 1131 (1972).
103. Many decisions openly concede that the social reports are hearsay, but ad-
mit them nonetheless. E.g., People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 136
Cal. Rptr. 392 (1976) (the reports are clearly hearsay).
104. These are the three conditions required by the hearsay rule. See notes
26-29 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 31-43 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Teitelbaum,supra note 86; Representing the Juvenile Defendant,
supra note 90, at 451-53.
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cross-examined testimony the court would be able to examine in
detail and test the validity of the investigative and reporting techni-
ques of the author of the report. The author's mere presence on the
stand would also make it possible to clear up any ambiguities or
misconceptions in the report. In addition, the sworn cross-examined
testimony of the authors and interviewees would aid greatly in ex-
posing any of the potentially biased, hostile, or misconceived feel-
ings that can render a report inaccurate.0 7
To absolutely require the testimony of all authors and inter-
viewees who contributed to the reports, however, may be contrary
to good notions of judicial economy. Unlike evidence concerning the
commission of the alleged crime where the number of victims and
eyewitnesses is usually small and may be controlled by the prosecu-
tion,"0 8 there may be more than one author and many interviewees
who had a part in the production of a report. Moreover, much of the
information contained in the report may be accurate and the
juvenile may not want to, or be able to, weaken certain author's pro-
cedures or an interviewee's statements. To require the testimony of
all these people could result in an unwarranted waste of judicial
time and cause needless hardship to the potential witnesses.
In order to assure accurate waiver decision-making and to pro-
tect the interests of judicial economy, the juvenile court judge
should be allowed to consider the social reports. Yet his final deci-
sion should not rest on the reports alone. The juvenile should be
given the power, through his counsel, to subpoena all persons whose
testimony is necessary to refute statements in the report or to sup-
plement the judge's understanding of it. The juvenile should be able
to subpoena, in good faith, all authors whom he believes to have
been biased, or whose reporting techniques were deficient, or whose
presence is necessary to explain a report. The juvenile should also
have the good faith subpoena power to require the presence and
sworn cross-examined testimony of all persons whom he believes to
have given a statement that was biased, hostile, or otherwise inac-
curate and unreliable.'
107. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
108. It has been advocated by this writer that sworn cross-examined testimony
should be required only of those victims and eyewitness upon whom the state intends
to rely in presenting its case for waiver. Thus, the number of persons called to the
stand to give testimony as to the nature and commission of the alleged crime could be
controlled in large part by the prosecutor.
109. A similar procedure has been advocated in Representing the Juvenile
Defendant, supra note 90. "Witnesses who are willing to supply the social worker with
information should be subpoenaed by the court to present the same information under
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The good faith aspect of this procedure should be regarded as
very important since it would act as a check on the number of per-
sons subpoenaed. What consistutes good faith should be determined
by a method similar to the in forma pauperis appeals procedure
employed by the federal courts."' Under this procedure the trial
court can deny leave for a pauper appeal if it finds that the appeal
would not be filed in good faith."' Good faith in this context is defin-
ed as an appeal that is not frivolous, as determined by an objective
standard and not by the subjective belief of the appellant."2 The
trial court must set out its finding of lack of good faith in writing
and the decision is reviewable by the appellate court."' Applying
this procedure to the waiver hearing, the juvenile court judge would
have the power to quash any subpoena that he objectively finds to
be frivolous or unreasonable. An affidavit or statement of reasons
detailing why the juvenile or his counsel feels the testimony of a
particular author or interviewee is necessary should be required as
this would be of great assistance to the judge in ruling on the sub-
poenas. The judge should be required to state in writing his reasons
for quashing any subpoena to facilitate appellate review of his deci-
sions.
By allowing the juvenile, through his counsel, to subpoena
those persons whose testimony he believes to be important to a full
understanding of the evidence the juvenile court would be taking a
great stride toward insuring that the information contained in social
reports is reliable and accurate. At the same time, by allowing
frivolous or unreasonable subpoenas to be quashed the important in-
terest of judicial economy would be protected. Therefore, this
method of presenting the evidence contained in social reports would
serve the interests of the juvenile, the community, and the juvenile
court.
oath." Id. at 452. This, in effect, would require the sworn testimony of all authors and
interviewees whose efforts or statements went into the composition of a report. The
problem with this proposal is that it ignores the needless waste of judicial time that
could result if all these people are required to testify.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) reads in pertinent part: "An appeal may not be taken
in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good
faith."
112. Coopedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); Miranda v. United
States, 458 F.2d 1179, 1181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 874 (1972); Harlem River
Consumer's Co-op v. Assoc. of Grocers of Harlem, 71 F.R.D. 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Sherbicki v. United States, 366 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Meyer v. New
York, 344 F. Supp. 1377, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
113. Coopedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445-47 (1962).
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Current Procedures for the Presentation of Social Reports
The various jurisdictions have formulated no less than three
procedures to deal with the problem of the admission of social
reports at waiver hearings."" Each of these procedures suffers from
a serious deficiency or oversight. The adopted methods either admit
some type of potentially unreliable evidence or they ignore the need
for reasonable judicial economy.
At least two states have statutorily prohibited the introduction
of hearsay evidence at waiver hearings. 5 Under the broad language
of these statutes116 and the judicial interpretations of them,1 1 7 the
hearsay prohibition applies equally to oral and written evidence.
Although the statutes effectively reduce the potential unreliability
of both testimonial and written hearsay"8 they create serious pro-
blems with regard to social reports. In order to introduce the impor-
tant information that is ordinarily contained in a social report the
statutes indirectly require the testimony of all authors and inter-
viewees. As previously mentioned, this could result in an un-
necessarily large number of people being called to the stand,
thereby wasting both the court's and the witnesses' valuable time.
A number of other states have statutory provisions that allow
for the subpoenaing and direct testimony of the authors of social
reports.11 These statutes accomplish a laudable purpose in that they
allow the juvenile and the court to examine and analyze the author's
procedures and techniques and to uncover any bias on the part of
the author. They also provide a means whereby the contents of a
report can be fully explained. These statutes, however, ignore the
114. See notes 116, 120, and 122-23 infra and accompanying text.
115. ALASKA RULES CHILD. PRO. 3(e), 17(a) (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-813,
60-460 (Vernon 1973).
116. Alaska provides that the same rules for the admissibility of evidence at
juvenile adjudications shall apply to waiver hearings. At the adjudicative phase hear-
say is not competent evidence. ALASKA RULES CHILD PRO. 3(e), 17(a) (1966).
Kansas' statute states that the rules of evidence for civil proceedings, including
the right of cross-examination are to be used in juvenile hearings. The Kansas rules of
evidence for civil proceedings exclude hearsay subject to generally recognized excep-
tions. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-813, 60-460 (Vernon 1973).
117. See In re Harris, - Kan. - , 544 P.2d 1403 (1976) (waiver order rev'd
for admission of written social report and letter).
118. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
119. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-3-108(3) (1973); FLA. RULES JUV. PRoc. 8.110(b)
(5). See also D.A.B. v. State, 329 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1976) (counsel must make specific
demand); State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St. 2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973) (counsel could
call and cross-examine authors under statute giving him access to the reports), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974).
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many possible deficiencies that may taint an interviewee's
statement."2 Therefore, the statutes only partially insure that the
judge's decision will be based on accurate and reliable evidence.
Under the final approach taken by some jurisdictions social
reports are admissible over hearsay objections and the juvenile is
provided with no opportunity to cross-examine either the authors or
the persons whose statements are contained in the reports.121 Many
of the same reasons used to justify the admission of testimonial
hearsay are employed to support this practice."2 Therefore, the
same refutations apply. 28 The courts, however, have come up with
some unique justifications for the admission of social reports,
despite their hearsay character.
Rationale for the Admission of Untested Social Reports
The Supreme Court in Kent v. United States"' held that for a
waiver order to be valid the juvenile's counsel must have access to
all social reports prior to the hearing, and must be given an oppor-
tunity to examine and refute their contents."5 This right of refuta-
tion has been interpreted by some jurisdictions to mean only that
the juvenile may present evidence to contradict the reports, and not
as a requirement that the authors and interviewees be available for
sworn cross-examination.' Obviously, access to the reports and the
right to present contrary evidence are essential if the juvenile is to
even attempt to expose any of the evidence's potential deficiencies.
Mere access and the power of extrinsic refutation, however, may not
be sufficient to adequately insure the accuracy and reliability of the
reports. It is well established that the potentially unreliable and in-
accurate qualities of evidence are most effectively brought to light
through sworn cross-examined testimony.'" By ignoring this princi-
ple the courts that grant the juvenile only the right to examine the
120. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.
121. E.g., People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr.
392 (1976); In re Murphy, 15 Md. App. 434, 291 A.2d 869 (1972); In re Honsaker, 539
S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); In re Harbert, 85 Wash. 2d 714, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975).
122. See notes 62-85 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 62-85 supra and accompanying text.
124. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
125. Id at 563.
126. People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d 698, 557 P.2d 976, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1976); Clemons v. State, - Ind. App. - , 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 859 (1975); In re Harbert, 85 Wash. 2d 719, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975). See also In re
J.S., 556 P.2d 541 (Okla. Crim. 1975) (held juvenile must be given opportunity to
criticize and refute the reports but declined to decide the proper procedure to be
used).
127. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
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reports and to present contrary evidence may be at least partially
depriving both the juvenile and themselves of the best opportunity
for a well-founded and accurate waiver decision.
A number of decisions reflect a belief that social reports must
be admitted over hearsay objection because the reports are required
by statute. 8 These courts are not to be faulted; they are merely
complying with a statutory mandate. As previously demonstrated,
much of the information contained in social reports may be poten-
tially unreliable." By merely stating that the juvenile court judge is
to consider social reports in reaching his waiver decisions the
legislatures have endorsed the practice of basing waiver decision on
potentially inaccurate evidence. Considering the substantial benefits
to the public derived from an accurate waiver decision'3 these
statutes appear to be in conflict with the legislature's responsibility
to protect the public welfare."'
Some courts have analogized waiver hearings to criminal
sentencings.1 2 Since a judge will usually consider reports at both a
sentencing and a waiver hearing and since the reports are usually
admissible at a sentencing, 8 these courts have concluded that social
reports are likewise admissible at waiver hearings.' Such as asser-
tion, it can be argued, merely compares one bad practice with
another. The presentence reports are often roundly criticized by
both commentators" and judges"' as being a poor substitute for
128. In re Murphy, 15 Md. App. 434,. 291 A.2d 869 (1972) (Maryland rules con-
template use of reports despite their hearsay character); In re Honsaker, 539 S.W.2d
198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Hughes v. State, 508 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (court
is duty bound to consider reports despite hearsay character).
129. See nots 88-99 supra and accompanying text.
130. The public has a substantial interest in a proper waiver decision in that if
a juvenile is incorrectly waived, society may lose a potentially productive citizen. On
the other hand, if a juvenile who is not likely to benefit from the rehabilitative ser-
vices of the juvenile system is retained in the system the public may be exposed to a
dangerous element sooner than necessary. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying
text.
131. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So. 387 (1932) (paramount duty
of the state is to protect the welfare of its citizens).
132. Clemons v. State, __ Ind. App. - , 317 N.E.2d 859 (1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 859 (1975); Sheppard v. Rhay, 73 Wash. 2d 734, 440 P.2d 422 (1968); Williams
v. Rhay, 73 Wash. 2d 770, 440 P.2d 427 (1968).
133. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1947) (court approved use of hearsay
probation reports at sentencing).
134. See note 132 supra.
135. Shapiro & Clement, Presentence Information in Felony Cases in the
Massachusetts Superior Courts, 10 SUFFOLK L. REV. 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Shapiro & Clement].
136. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)
[hereinafter cited as M. FRANKEL]. In discussing the pervasive use of presentence
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reliable evidence.'37 In fact, one survey has shown that the most
common judicial complaint about presentence reports is that they
are inaccurate."M Rather than admitting social reports over hearsay
objections at waiver hearings because they are admissible at senten-
cings, the better practice would be to require more reliable evidence
at both waiver hearings and sentencings.'"
Although there are substantial similarities between waiver
hearings and sentencings there are also substantial differences. The
two types of hearings are at opposite ends of the judicial spectrum.
In a sentencing the defendant has already been convicted and all
that remains to be determined is the appropriate punishment. At a
waiver hearing the juvenile's guilt or innocence has not yet been
ascertained, nor will it be until after the hearing.' ° Moreover, pro-
bable cause for the juvenile's arrest has not yet been determined."'
In light of the benevolent purpose of the juvenile system"' and the
fact that the juvenile has merely been charged with a crime it would
seem that he should be entitled to more procedural and evidentiary
safeguards than an adult who has already been found in violation of
the law.
reports the author states, "[wihat ought to be perfectly clear ... is the intolerable risk
of error when we rely for grave decisions of law upon untested hearsay and rumor."
Id. at 32.
137. The potential dangers in a presentence report are vividly illustrated by a
New Jersey case, State v. Pohlabel, 61 N.J. Super. 242, 160 A.2d 647 (1960). The defen-
dant had pleaded guilty to charges of forging seven checks worth a total of $1,400. He
was twenty-six, married, and had two children. His only previous criminal conviction
was for the theft of a car when he was 18. The presentence report stated that the
defendant had "lived a life of crime" and had "spent the greater part of his life in
penal institutions." The defendant was sentenced to seven consecutive terms totaling
twenty-one to thirty-five years. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case,
finding the presentence report to be "misleading and inaccurate." But this decision was
not rendered until the defendant had spent nine years in the state prison.
138. Shapiro & Clement, supra note 135, at 58. See also Grygiar, A Computer
Made Device for Sentencing-Is Further Computing and Thinking Really Necessary?,
8 J. RESEARCH CRIM & DELIN. 194, 200 (1969) (sentencing judges are overburdened with
information which is often conflicting).
139. Judge Frankel has advocated the use of "sentencing counsels" and "mixed
sentencing tribunals," as proposed by S. GLUECK, CRIME AND JUSTICE 225-26 (1936), and
appellate review of sentencing to alleviate the problems in the sentencing process,
among them the hearsay problems involved in presentence reports. M. FRANKEL, supra
note 136, at 69-86.
140. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (adjudication of delinquency prior to
waiver decision violates double jeopardy clause of the Constitution).
141. A determination of probable cause is one of the two main functions of the
typical waiver hearing. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text.
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It has been argued here that the present methods of presen-
ting the information usually contained in social reports either
overlook the need for competent and reliable evidence at the waiver
hearings, or they fail to adequately protect the interests of judicial
economy. The reasons given in support of the practice of admitting
untested social reports over hearsay objections may be inadequate
to outweigh the need for competent and reliable evidence. The
jurisdictions that prohibit any form of hearsay at waiver hearings,
however, may create serious problems of judicial economy when
their rulings are applied to social reports. Finally, the states that
provide only for the testimony of the authors of the reports
overlook the potential unreliability of an interviewee's statement to
a juvenile probation officer. Clearly then, the best method of produc-
ing this type of evidence at waiver hearings would be to allow the
juvenile judge to consider the social reports. However, the juvenile
should be granted the power to subpoena all persons whose sworn
cross-examined testimony he believes in good faith to be necessary
to a full and accurate understanding of the reports. This procedure
would aid greatly in producing accurate and reliable evidence at the
waiver hearings and at the same time would mitigate the possibility
of unwarranted judicial time being spent on the waiver question.
CONSISTENCY WITH EXISTING POLICIES
This note has advocated the use of methods for the introduc-
tion of evidence at waiver hearings that, in some cases, differ great-
ly from the established practices. It is submitted though, that these
methods are consistent with the principal purpose of waiver hear-
ings. These methods are also consistent with McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania,' in which the Supreme Court discussed the criteria for
determining what procedures are to be employed in the juvenile
system.
The foundation of the current juvenile justice system is the
doctrine of parens patriae. Under parens patriae every effort is
made to rehabilitate the child and thereby transform him into a pro-
ductive member of the community. 14 The concept of punishment is
largely excluded. Once a juvenile is waived to adult court, however,
all reasons for complying with the parens patriae philosophy disap-
pear." 5 It follows that before a juvenile court waives a child and
143. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
144. See notes 8-13 supra and accompanying text.
145. Once waived a juvenile is considered an adult and is treated the same as
any other criminal defendant. See notes 38-40, 43 suprL
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refuses to even attempt to rehabilitate him, every reasonable
precaution should at taken to insure the inability of the system to
deal with the child. By requiring the victims and eyewitnesses of the
alleged crime to testify, and by allowing the juvenile to subpoena
those pesons whose testimony is necessary to an accurate
understanding of the social reports, a juvenile court would be taking
such precautions. The paternally benevolent attitude that pervades
the juvenile system under parens patriae is in accordance with this
type of protection.
These precautions are also consistent with the principal pur-
pose of the waiver hearing. In general terms, the waiver hearing
functions to decide whether the best interests of the child and/or the
community will be served by retaining the child within the juvenile
system or by treating him as an adult criminal defendant.' This
purpose may not be adequately served when crucial aspects of the
waiver decision are based on potentially unreliable evidence. If a
juvenile is improperly waived he obviously suffers;"7 but the com-
munity also suffers in the sense that it may lose a productive
citizen. 48 Likewise, if a juvenile is improperly retained in the
juvenile system the public may have a dangerous criminal in its
ranks sooner than necessary."9 Basing the waiver decision on poten-
tially unreliable evidence only tends to increase the risk of an incor-
rect waiver decision. If the juvenile court were to require the
testimony of the victims and eyewitnesses of the alleged crime, and
grant the juvenile subpoena power over authors and interviewees of
the social reports, the juvenile court would stimulate the production
of reliable evidence, thereby serving the interests of both the child
and the community.
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania'" the Supreme Court discussed
the criteria for ascertaining what procedures are to be "super-
imposed" on the juvenile system. In general, these criteria are:
whether application of the right is necessary to achieve fundamental
fairness, and whether application of the right would disrupt the
146. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
147. The juvenile loses the prospects of rehabilitation, the protection of
anonymity, the right to raise the defense of diminished responsibility, and he faces
longer periods of incarceration. See notes 31-40 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
149. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
150. 403 U.S. 528 (1971). McKeiver concerned the adjudicative phase of the
juvenile system and held there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile
adjudicatory hearing. See also Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
19781
et al.: Juvenile Waiver Hearings and the Hearsay Rule—The Need for Reliab
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978
426 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
juvenile system. The practice of basing a decision of the magnitude
and importance of the waiver decision on unreliable evidence would
appear to be patently unfair when there are readily available pro-
cedures for testing the accuracy and reliability of the evidence. In
fact, in applying the fundmental fairness standard to juvenile ad-
judications the emphasis of the Supreme Court has been on insuring
the accuracy of fact-finding procedures."' In light of the fact that the
procedures advocated here would tend to produce more accurate
evidence, they are therefore consistent with the criterion of fun-
damental fairness. These procedures would do little to disrupt the
juvenile system. Although in some cases these procedures may
result in more juvenile court time being spent on deciding waiver
petitons, it is submitted that the benefits derived from more ac-
curate waiver decisions vastly outweigh this interest. The informali-
ty of the waiver hearing"" would also not be drastically compromis-
ed by the implementation of the advocated procedures. The juvenile
court functions in an informal atmosphere only to aid in a full
understanding of the juvenile and the case before it."' Procedures
that are designed to insure the accuracy and reliability of the
evidence before the court are clearly not in conflict with such a pur-
pose.
CONCLUSION
For centuries the Anglo-American legal tradition has recogniz-
ed the need for reliable and competent evidence at all crucial stages
of the judicial process and has produced the hearsay rule as one
method of fulfilling this need. With the development of the juvenile
system, particularly the waiver hearing, a controversy has arisen
over the best methods with which to meet the benevolent purposes
of the system while continuing to maintain the tradition of basing
important judicial decisions on reliable evidence. The controversy
has not been resolved. The present majority of jurisdictions favor
the practice of admitting hearsay evidence at waiver hearings.
Whether this practice does anything to fulfill the purposes of the
juvenile system is highly questionable. What is relatively certain is
that the practice allows for, and in fact encourages, the basing of the
151. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt is con-
stitutionality required in juvenile adjudications); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) (in an
adjudication the juvenile has right against self-incrimination, right of confrontation,
and right to sworn cross-examined testimony of all witnesses).
152. See notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text.
153. E.g., People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal. 3d at 719, 557 P.2d at 989, 135 Cal.
Rptr. at 405.
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waiver decision on potentially unreliable and inaccurate evidence.
This can be detrimental not only to the child, but also to the com-
munity of which he is a part.
It has been advocated that hearsay testimony by a police of-
ficer regarding his investigation of the alleged crime should be pro-
hibited. This testimony should be replaced by the sworn and cross-
examined testimony of the victims and eyewitnesses of the alleged
crime upon whom the state intends to rely. By following this pro-
cedure the juvenile court would be taking the best available steps
toward insuring that the evidence of the nature and commission of
the alleged crime is of a reliable and competent character.
It has also been asserted that the mere submission of written
social reports to the juvenile court judge is a practice that enhances
the chance that the waiver decision may be incorrect. The informa-
tion contained in social reports is important to a knowledgeable
waiver decision, especially as it relates to the juvenile's amenability
to rehabilitation. For this evidence to be reliable and accurate it
should not be considered entirely in the form of hearsay. To require
the presence and sworn cross-examined testimony of all authors and
interviewees, however, may result in unwarranted hardships on the
witnesses and in excessive court time being spent in waiver hear-
ings. In response, it has been advocated that the juvenile judge con-
tinue to be allowed to consider the social reports. Additionally,
however, the juvenile should be given the right to subpoena all per-
sons whose testimony he believes in good faith to be essential to a
fair and accurate understanding of the evidence contained in the
reports.
Unless these methods are adopted the juvenile courts will con-
tinue to base waiver decisions on potentially unreliable and incompe-
tent evidence. These courts will continue to run the risk of waiving
juveniles who may be capable of becoming useful citizens, while re-
taining in the juvenile system minors who pose a threat to society.
Such a result is not satisfactorily supported by the current judicial
rationales, is in conflict with notions of justice under the juvenile
system, and should no longer be tolerated.
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